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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
r''c '.iTATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff /Respondent 
JrJSEPH LOVATO, Case No. 18993 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction and judgment of Aggravated 
Sexual Assault, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Section 405, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
• 
Appellant's motion for a directed verdict to the jury ordering 
them to bring back a verdict of not guilty was denied. The jury 
found the appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault. Pursuant 
rn the verdict, appellant was sentence to a term of five years 
'.n life in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction of Aggravated 
cDv,u'll Assault or, in the alternative, that his case be remanded 
Hre District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 17, 1982, between 1·30 a.m. and 2 0(1 a.m, se·1 e 1 , 
people dropped by the apartment where Carme1 i to Romero ("Complai, 
ant") was staying (T. 5, 7, 9). Complainant knew before hand that 
one of the men, John Hall, was coming over, but did not know 
the others would stop by (T. 7). Joseph Lovato ("Appellant") 
was among the people at the apartment (T.8). 
The group listened to music, used the phone and talked for a 
couple hours before everyone except complainant left (T.6,9). 
Appellant could not get a ride home so he returned to the 
apartment and asked complainant if he could use her phone to 
call for a ride (T. 10-11). 
Complainant let appellant in and he made two calls from the 
phone located in the bedroom in an attempt to get a ride (T.11, 
205,235). Appellant spoke with his aunt at about 3:25 a.m. and, 
after speaking with her, expected a cab to arrive at the apartment 
(T. 207,235). 
While complainant and appellant agree that sexual intercourse 
took place between them that night, their testimony about how 
that came about differs. 
According to appellant, after he made his calls, compla'nant 
told him she was pregnant and that her boyfriend left her 
of it and she did not know what she was going to do (T.208). 
Complainant then went into the bathroom and returned wearing onl·· 
a white jersey and black panties and invited appellant into the 
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(,edroom (T. 209). They had sexual intercourse, by mutual consent, 
,,,lLh complainant on top and appellant underneath, on his back 
throughout (T.209). They also engaged in cunnilingus and fellatio 
(T. 64-65). Appellant never took off his clothes because he 
had seen a suitcase and work boots in the apartment, and expected 
a man to return for them (T.209). 
The pocket knife appellant had used earlier at the apartment 
to clean his nails was in his pocket (T. 203,210). It had a 
single small, dull blade (T. 203,204). It fell out of appellant's 
pocket during intercourse (T. 56,210). According to both 
complainant and appellant, complainant found the knife in the bed 
and gave it to appellant (T. 56,210). The knife was lost by the 
prosecution and not placed into evidence at trial (T.190-192). 
Complainant testified at trial that appellant grabbed her 
by the bones of the throat while she stood with him at the 
front door (T. 14,50,51). The front door was open (T. 51). 
According to complainant (at trial) appellant had one hand on 
her throat and held the knife to her temple with the other hand, 
then dragged her into the bedroom (T. 51-54). There was no 
testimony as to how or whether the front door was ever closed 
although complainant's testimony indicates that it was not open 
later when Nils Swenson came over (T. 26-27,78-79). 
On the night of the incident, complainant told the officer 
3 different version--that she initially did not want to let 
aopellant into the apartment and that she was carried into the 
Ledroom and thrown onto the bed before a knife was drawn (T. 145-146). 
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Complainant also testified at tri:-d t!1a1_ a!'pcll.int threw 
her against the bed, floor and 1val ls (T Li\). She haJ n<>t 
previously mentioned being thrown against the walls (T. l/4fi) 
She had no bruises on her back, arms or throat (T. 62,95-100). 
Neither her clothing nor underpants were torn (T. 62). She 
did not kick, scratch, bite or yell (T. 56). 
The night of the incident, complainant told both appellant 
and Officer Davis that she was pregnant (T. 70,146-147,208). 
However, at trial she testified, or at least implied by her 
testimony, that she had not been pregnant at the time (T. 70,84). 
Complainant and appellant turned on the television and 
talked after the intercourse. Complainant testified that she did 
not know where the knife was during this time, and that she did 
not pay much attention to where it was (T.69-70). 
At some point during their time alone together, appellant 
and complainant discussed complainant's cousin, Julia, and 
another woman, Charlena, and appellant's relationship with them 
(T. 66-67). Complainant asked appellant "what Charlena was to 
him" and believedCharlena was his girlfriend (T. 66-67). 
Appellant thought this conversation took place before they had 
intercourse; complainant testified that she brought the subject 
up after they had intercourse (T. 52,66-67). 
Complainant was angry with Julia and Charlena on the ni6hr 
of the incident. She believed Charelena had cut the waterbed 
(T. 39-40, 67-68). 
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At about 6:00 a.m., complainant told appellant that her 
"L1ther" was coming to get the suitcase and boots, and that 
she needed to call him (T. 21-22,68-69). Appellant helped 
oer find the phone number in the phone book (T. 68-69). 
Complainant actually telephoned Nils Swenson, the man who paid 
rent for the apartment, owned the waterbed, and allowed 
complainant to stay at the apartment rent free (T. 21-22,60-69). 
Appellant was awake when complainant dialed and knew that 
complainant's "father" might be coming to the apartment (T.70-71). 
Appellant lay on the bed fully clothed and fell asleep in the 
midst of complainant's conversation with Nils Swenson (T. 71). 
About half an hour after complainant phoned him, Nils 
Swenson arrived at the apartment (T. 26). Throughout that 
period, appellant lay sleeping on the bed (T. 73,76). Complain-
ant was in the kitchen and living room, and was as near the front 
door as the bedroom while appellant slept. Had appellant been 
awake, he would not have been able to see the front door without 
leaning to the side of the bed (T. 72,86-87). 
There were apartments on both sides of the apartment, in 
addition to a store and laundry (T. 121-122). Numerous over-
crowdedapartments were across the street (T. 122-123). Although 
appellant was asleep for over half an hour, complainant did not 
leave the apartment nor call for help (T. 74-78). 
When Nils Swenson finally arrived, complainant held a note 
up to the front window telling him to call the police (T. 27,112). 
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Swenson stepped closer to the door to read note (T. 112). 
Complainant did not leave the apartment when Swenson arr i V<"d 
she chose to remain with appellant (T. 78-7g). 
Swenson went to the corner and called the police (T 113). 
The police arrived and parked out of view (T. 113, 13 3-134) . 
Several minutes later, complainant exited the apartment (T. 134) 
Officer Davis was impressed by how controlled she was (T. 135). 
Appellant was still asleep, stomach down, when the officers 
entered the bedroom and cuffed him from the rear (T. 140). 
Complainant was examined following the incident. While no 
sperm was found in her vagina, sperm was found in the crotch 
of her underwear (T. 93,158). 
Following the incident, a rape crisis volunteer filled out 
an incident report form (T. 173). The form indicated that 
complainant's last sexual intercourse prior to the incident 
occurred on January 25, 1981 (T. 242). Defense counsel was not 
permitted to ask that question nor to attempt to establish that 
complainant had intercourse less than forty eight hours prior 
to the incident even though complainant had already made it clear 
to the jury that she was not chaste (see T. 19,238-246). 
Following the examination, complainant was given medication 
to abort pregnancy and eliminate venereal disease (T. 79,102). 
Appellant was tried and convicted of aggravated sexual 
assault, a first degree felony. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF COMPLAINANT'S 
LAST SEXUAL INTERCOURSE PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT. 
A. THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMITTED TO 
SHOW COMPLAINANT CONSENTED TO THE ACT. 
It has long been the rule in Utah that where a defendant in 
a rape case claims that no intercourse occurred, evidence of a 
complainant's prior sexual activity or chastity is not admissible. 
See State v. Scott, 188 P. 860 (Utah 1920); State v. Sims, 517 
P.2d 466 (Utah 1975); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980). 
However, where the critical issue is consent, courts have admitted 
such evidence. See State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466,469; 
State v. Scott, supra at 864. The probative value of such evi-
dence was set forth in State v. Scott, supra at 864: 
Where the defendant admits the sexual act, 
but contends that the proseuctrix consented 
thereto, and where, as here, she is of law-
ful age, such evidence is relevant and 
material upon the question of consent. 
While it is true that even a prostitute 
may refuse consent to the sexual act, yet, 
in contemplation of the law, a lewd woman 
is much more likely to consent to such an 
act than a chaste woman would be. Hence, 
evidence that the prosecutrix was generally 
reputed to be unchaste is relevant for the 
purpose just stated. 
In recent years, this Court has recognized the inherent 
prejudice caused a complainant where evidence of her prior 
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unchastity is introduced as well as the emliaras:;ment and ordeal 
a complainant can be subjected to when such evidence is admi•te, 
See State v. Johns, supra. On the other hand, this Court hac 
recognized that a rape accusation generally evolves from a 
situation involving only two people and is easy to charge but 
difficult to defend. State v. Herzog, 610 P.2d 1281,1283 
(Utah 1980); State v. Horne, 364 P.2d 109,112 (Utah 1961); 
State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466, 469 (Utah 1975). 
In State v. Johns, supra, this Court resolved the tension 
between these two competing concerns by acknowledging that 
evidence of a complainant's prior sexual activity may be 
relevant where consent is at issue, but can only be admitted 
where the probative value of such evidence outweighs the inherent 
danger of unfair prejudice as well as the possibility of confusion 
of issues, unwarranted invasion of privacy and needless presenta-
tion of issues. See State v. Johns, supra. 
In State v. Pope, 545 P.2d 946 (Arizona 1976), the Arizona 
Supreme Court recognized that there are certain situations where 
evidence of prior unchaste acts of the complainant has sufficient 
probative value to outweigh the inflamatory effect and 
require admission. "These would include evidence. which 
directly refutes physical or scientific evidence, such as the 
victim's alleged loss of virginity, the orgin of semen, diseas 0 
or pregnancy," State v. Pope, supra at 255. 
In this case, the probative value of evidence that complain-
ant had sexual intercourse with someone other than appellant 
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-
,; '), Ln fortv eight hours of the incident clearly outweighs the 
· •11c·erns set forth in State v. Johns, supra. 
The fact that complainant had intercourse with someone 
11runediately prior to the intercourse with appellant would have 
bolstered appellant's theory that complainant was pregnant, 
or at least believed herself to be, and that complainant had 
venereal disease and consented to intercourse, thereafter 
accusing appellant of rape, in an effort to shield herself. 
The evidence indicates that complainant was pregnant at the 
time of the incident, or at least believed herself to be, since 
she told both appellant and the police officer at the scene 
that she was pregnant (See T. 70,146-147,208). 
The evidence also suggests that complainant transferred 
some form of venereal disease to appellant. Appellant had not 
had intercourse for over a month prior to the incidenct with 
complainant; two weeks after the incident, while still confined 
in the county jail, appellant contracted a form of venereal 
disease which could have been sexually transmitted (see T. 
212-214,200). It was appellant's theory that complainant 
desired to protect herself by accusing appellant and possibly 
obtaining medication to abort the pregnancy and eliminate the 
venereal disease. Evidence that complainant had recent sex 
another would have enhanced this theory. 
In addition, the existence of sperm on the crotch of 
1:omplainant' s underwear was introduced as physical evidence by 
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the proseuction to bolster its case, The Sflc>CTTJ \vilS not directl, 
linked to appellant, however, absent information thal comrlain• 
had sex with another immediately µrior to the incident with 
appellant, it is safe to assume that the jury made such a 
connection and considered the location of the sperm as probative 
to the proseuction's case. Evidence that complainant had recent 
sex with another would have caused the jury to question who 
deposited the sperm. As the evidence stood, no such question 
would arise. When such evidence is coupled with evidence that 
complainant was angry with Charlena and believed Charlena to be 
appellant's girlfriend, the case showing complainant's motive to 
consent and later to lie is strengthened. 
Clearly, evidence that complainant had prior sex with another 
is probative to the issue of consent since it shows complainant 
had a reason to consent in order to shield herself and could 
raise questions as to physical evidence introduced by prosecution 
to show lack of consent. 
The probative value of such evidence outweighs the concerns 
set forth in State v. Johns, supra. 
First, there would be no undue prejudice by admitting this 
evidence. Complainant had already made it clear to the jury 
that she was not inexperienced when she explained to the Court 
and jury that she did not like cunnilingus (T .19). The implicc-
tion in such statement is, of course, that she is sexually 
experienced and experienced enough to know her prefences. In 
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· i J1r of this, she would not be prejudiced by introduction of 
·[Jenee that she had previously had sexual intercourse since 
,11c had alreadv made the jury aware of that fact. 
Second, there would not have been a confusion of the issues. 
Appellant merely wanted to establish that the bruises and 
semen could have been caused by another and that complainant 
had a reason to consent and thereafter implicate appellant. 
Nor would there be invasion of privacy or needless 
presentation of evidence. Defense counsel endeavored to ask 
only one question. No names were sought and, as previously 
stated, complainant had already clarified to the jury that she 
was sexually experienced. 
In balance, it is clear that the probative value of such 
evidence outweigh the other considerations, and therefore, 
should have been admitted. 
The excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial 
influence in bringing about a different verdict, since evidence 
of sexual intercourse immediately prior to the incident when 
combined with evidence of complainant's pregnancy and anger 
at Charlena would have bolstered appellant's theory and 
possibily caused the jury to return a different verdict. In 
J;ght of this, the verdict should be overturned. See Rules 
·if E•;iJence 5, Utah Code Ann. (as amended 1953). 
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B. ADMISSIBLE AS TO CREDIBILlfY. 
Although the issues of credibility of the compldinant in a 
rape case and consent are somewhat overlapping, they are 
clearly two separate questions. See dicta in State v. Smith, 
62 P.2d 1110,1113 (Utah 1936). 
While the law does not and should not recognize any 
connection between veracity of a witness and her sexual promiscuit·· 
prior sexual acts can provide a motive to alter the truth when 
testifying. See State v. Scott, supra at 865; State v. Johns, 
supra at 1264. 
In State v. Scott, supra at 865, this court stated in dicta 
that in a prosecution for rape where the defendant's theory 
was that the complainant was pregnant by another and prosecuting 
appellant to shield herself, it would be proper on 
to establish that fact and to show complainant had intercourse 
with a third person. See also State v. Smith, supra at 1113. 
Evidence that complainant had sex within forty eight hours 
of the incident would have been probative as to credibility, not 
because her veracity was linked to promiscuity, but because 
she may have had a motive to lie, i.e., that she was pregnant 
or had venereal disease, and desired to shield herself. This 
evidence, coupled with complainant's anger at Charlena whom 
she believed to be appellant's girlfriend, takes on even greater 
probative value. 
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Even where the balancing test set forth in State v. Johns, 
is applied, this evidence, as previously outlined, out-
•.;eighs concerns which might otherwise preclude its admission. 
Thus , the evidence should have been admitted. 
In this case, where complainant is the principal witness 
against appellant, it is critical that appellant be permitted 
to attack complainant's credibility. Failure to admit evidence 
of complainant's last sexual intercourse prior to the incident 
severely hampered appellant and such evidence would probably 
have had a substantial impact on the minds of the jury. 
C. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO ADMIT SUCH 
EVIDENCE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES 
AGAINST HIM. 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 
guarantees an accused the right to confront witnesses against 
him. Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees 
a similar right. The right to confront witnesses is more than 
a mere right to face witnesses; it includes the right of a 
defendant to cross-examine witnesses against him. Davis v. 
415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. ll05, 39 L.ed.2d 347 (1974). 
One aspect of is the ability to expose a 
witness' motive in testifying. See State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 
1386, 1388 (Utah 1977). See also Davis v. Alaska, supra. 
While limiting cross-examination is within the discretion 
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of the court, "(t)he court is particul:irl· c·11·c·1·,.1_ t" allm-1 
wide latitude in areas of and mot1v<. f,,, testif,,·i11,•,." 
State v. Maestas, supra at 1258. 
As previously outlined, evidence that complainant had 
intercourse within forty eight hours of the incident was 
relevant to the issues of consent and credibility of the 
complainant, and such relevancy outweighed any concerns as to 
undue prejudice, confusion of issues or needless presentation 
of evidence. Failure to admit such evidence inhibited 
appellant's opportunity to establish complainant's motive to 
testify falsely and to otherwise cross-examine complainant 
and thereby violated appellant's right to confront witnesses 
against him, thereby depriving him of due process of law. 
POINT II 
THE STATES FAILURE TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE IN 
ITS POSSESSION DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW. 
The duty of the prosecution to preserve evidence in its 
possession has evolved from the prosecution's duty to disclose 
favorable evidence to an accused as set forth in Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady v. Maryland, the U.S.S.( 
held: 
that the suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process of law where 
the evidence is material either to guilt or 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith 
or bad faith of the prosecution. 
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'' i "' 8 7. 
The right to discovery set forth in Brady is applicable in 
cl:c,·e situations: (1) where state's case contains perjured 
:cstimony and such testimony could have affected the verdict, 
regardless if whether a request for discovery was made; (2) where 
the state fails to disclose evidence which was specifically 
rPquested; and (3) where undisclosed evidence raises a reasonable 
doubt as to guilt, regardless of whether such evidence was 
requested. See also Codianna v. Myers, 660 P. 2d 1101, 1106 (Utah, 
1983); U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-113 (1976). 
Courts in other jurisdictions have expanded the prosecution's 
duty to disclose to include the duty to preserve evidence. In 
Gnited States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 643 (D.C.Cir. 1973), the Court 
remanded the case where the state did not preserve a tape record-
ing between defendant and narcotics agents to determine: (1) the 
efforts by the state to preserve the tape; (2) the importance of 
che lost tape; and (3) the evidence of guilt at trial. Id. at 
653. The court pointed out that the government bears a heavy 
burden to explain the loss, based on its duty to preserve 
which might be favorable to the defendant. Id. at 652. 
See also State v. Wright, 87 Wash. 2d 783, 557 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1976); 
l'_Pnnle v. Morgan, 606 P.2cl 1296 (Colo. 1980). 
Colorado applies a three prong test in determining whether 
l•ctruction of evidence violates a defendant's due process rights: 
(1) Whether evidence was suppressed or destroyed 
by prosecution; 
(2) Whether evidence was exculpatory; 
(3) Whether evidence was material to defendant's case. 
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State v. Morgan, 
Since in destruction cases the evidence no longer exisrs 
to determine whether it is favorable to courts 
have relaxed the materiality standard and found a due process 
violation where there was a "reasonable possibility that the 
evidence destroyed by the police or at their direction was 
material to guilt or innocence and favorable to appellant," 
State v. Wright, supra at 6. 
This Court has not dealt directly with the prosecution's 
duty to preserve evidence. In State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477, 
(Utah 1975), this Court acknowledged that the deliberate 
suppression or destruction of evidence violates due process 
if such evidence was material. However, in the context of 
prosecutorial duty to disclose, this Court has acknowledged 
that good faith is irrelevant where evidence favorable to the 
accused is suppressed and a specific request for such evidence 
has been made. See State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980). 
The Jarrell court stated: 
The overriding concern in cases involving 
prosecutorial nondisclosure of evidence 
which tends to exculpate the defendant is 
the defendant's right to a fair trial in 
a criminal trial it is essential that evi-
dence which tends to exonerate the defendant 
be aired as fullv as that which tends to 
exonerate him. 
Id. at 225. 
This focus on fairness to the defendant rather tha"l prosecu-
torial misconduct is found throughout the cases dealing with the 
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ro disclose as well as the dutv to preserve and should be 
,:, 1•! iPd in the present situation in determining whether failure 
LO '"serve the knife violated appellant's due process right. 
ln line with decisions in regard to the prosecution's 
Jut; to disclose and preserve evidence, appellant urges this 
Court to consider: (1) the role of the prosecution in regard to 
the failure to preserve the evidence; and (2) whether there was 
a reasonable possibility the evidence was material; and (3) 
whether the evidence was exculpatory. 
In this case, the State failed to preserve the pocketknife 
aopellant allegedly used to threaten complainant. The pocket-
knife had a single small dull blade (T. 203,204). Appellant 
used it as a screwdriver and to clean his nails (T. 203). 
Complainant was unintimidated enough by the knife that she 
returned it to appellant when she found it in the bed, and there-
after paid no attention to its location (T. 56,69,210). 
Clearly, the prosecution had custody and control over the 
knife from the moment it was taken from appellant at the scene. 
The prosecution brought it as evidence to the preliminary hearing 
IT. 191). The loss can only be attributed to the prosecution, 
and good or bad faith of the prosectuion is irrelevant. 
The knife is clearly material to the case since the charge 
of sexual assault, rather than rape, stems from use 
')[ the knife, and much of complainant's testimony revolved around 
?nc:cetknife. 
There is a reasonable possibility that admission of the pocket-
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knife would have tended to exculrate '-'P!'cd l .int .\ll of the 
testimony as to the knife shmveJ i r tu lie 1, du] 1 .rnJ more 
like a screwdriver or nail file than a knife. Admission of a 
small dull pocketknife could have created a less threatening, 
less frightening impression on the jury and when coupled with 
the inconsistencies in complainant's story and the other evidenti· 
ary problems set forth infra, it is likely that admission of 
such evidence would have had a significant impact on the jury. 
Thus, the prosecution's failure to preserve the knife as 
evidence but nevertheless introduce testimony in regard to it 
violated appellant's due process rights and right to a fair 
trial, and caused prejudicial error, thereby requiring that the 
verdict be overturned. 
POINT III 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION. 
A. THE COMPLAINANT'S STORY IS SUFFICIENTLY 
INCONCLUSIVE OR IMPROBABLE. 
While the issues of whether a complainant consented or 
succumbed against her will are generally questions for the jury, 
a conviction must be overturned for lack of sufficient evidence 
where the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherenth 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
able doubt that the appellant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted," State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,444 (l.:tah 1983) 
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State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161,1168 (Utah 1980). See 
Jl"J ?tate v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1980); State v. 
364 P. 2d 109 (Utah 1961). 
In a case where the charge is rape, the evidence must be 
carefully scrutinized to avoid unmerited conviction- State v. 
Stettina, 635 P.2d 74,77 (Utah 1981); see also State v. Herzog, 
SlO P 2d 1281,1283 (Utah 1980), State v. Horne, supra. The ease 
of the assertion of the charge and the difficulty of proving 
the defense other than by the appellant's denial should be 
considered in determining the sufficiency of the evidence. State 
v. Horne, 635 P.2d 109 (Utah 1961); State v. Herzog, 610 P.2d 1281, 
1283 (Utah 1980). The intent of such scrutiny is "the protection 
of one who engages in intimate relations with another under the 
impression that all is proceeding by mutual consent, only to be 
faced later by a claim of rape," State v. Herzog, supra at 1283. 
A careful consideration of the evidence in this case, in 
light of the case of the assertion and the difficulty of defense 
of the charge establishes that complainant's story is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable so that reasonable minds 
would not find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed 
the offense. The fabric of evidence against the appellant must 
cover the gap betwen the presumption of innocence and proof of 
z;uilt in order to sustain the conviction. State v. Petree, supra. 
ru this case, even stretching the evidence to its limit, it fails 
ro bridge that gap. 
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First, much of complainant's clairn that appellant rhre>.1L.:·· 
her with serious bodily injur1 revolves around tile pocketkn1rc 
As previously outlined, the only description of the blade of 
knife is that it was a small, dull blade which was not in good 
working order to cut things, but functioned as a tool or screw-
driver or for cleaning nails (T. 204). Appellant had used the 
knife earlier in the evening to clean his nails so complainant 
should have been aware he had a pocketknife in his possession 
(T. 203-204). The pocketknife ended up loose in the bed, complaG 
ant returned it to appellant (T. 56, 210). After that, complainant 
did not pay attention to where the knife was (T. 69-70). 
The description of the pocketknife coupled with the fact 
that complainant returned it to appellant then paid no attention 
to where it was shows that complainant was not frightened by 
the knife. In addition, as previously discussed, in spite of 
the prosecutorial duty to preserve evidence, the knife was not 
placed into evidence. Thus, this inconclusive testimony is the 
only evidence introduced in regard to the knife. 
Complainant described scenes at both the front door and in 
the bedroom. She testified that appellant held a knife to her 
throat and cheek, but no knife marks were found on her and her 
clothing was not cut. Complainant also testified that appellant 
threw her against the floor, walls and headboard, but her arms, 
legs, back, head and torso were not bruised (T. 62,95-100). 
Absent any bruising, complainants tale of physical ·1iolence 
is inherently improbable. 
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As will be discussed later in more detail, complainant made 
'" ,.,·al inconsistent statements at trial. Prior to trial, she 
stated that the knife did not come out until she was in the 
bedroom (T. 145-146). At trial, she testified for the first 
time in great detail that she was threatened with the knife at 
the open front door (T. 51-54). This major inconsistency in 
her tale makes the story inconclusive. 
Complainant had several opportunities to escape or cry out 
for help. Her failure to do so when such opportunities presented 
themselves adds to the improbability of her version. According 
to complainant, the front door was open when appellant initially 
pulled the knife (T. 51). There were apartments on either side 
and numerous over-crowded apartments across the street but 
complainant did not cry out nor did she try to escape (T. 121-22, 
86-87). Later, appellant helped complainant telephone her "father" 
(T. 68-69). Appellant fell asleep, fully clothed on the bed 
(T. 71). It took about half an hour for complainant's friend to 
arrive (T. 26). During that time, appellant slept and complainant 
moved around the living room and kitchen, but did not try to 
leave (T. 72,74-78,86-87). 
When complainant's friend arrived, she showed him a note 
c!lro11gh the window, but again did not attempt to leave even 
thuugh appellant was asleep (T. 27,78-79,112). She chose to 
more than five additional minutes with appellant even though 
knew her friend was waiting outside (T. 133). This failure 
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to cry out or leave when presented with an h:•·•;•11te opportunit 
to do so enhances the improbabilitv of complainant's srorv. 
Finally, appellant's actions make complainant's storv 
inconclusive. Appellant allegedly threatened and raped her, 
then helped her find a phone number to call "her father" (T. 21-: 
68-69). Appellant slept peacefully while complainant moved 
around the apartment and up until the time the officers placed 
the handcuffs on him (T. 71-73,76,140). This hardly suggests 
that appellant had just corrnnitted the crime charged. 
In all, the evidence showing that appellant threatened 
complainant and that complainant did not consent to the act is 
sufficently inconclusive that reasonable minds could not find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant corrnnitted the crime and 
therefore the conviction should be reversed. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW ON 
"CONSENT" AND "AGAINST THE WILL" IN A 
RAPE CASE. 
Defense counsel proposed the following instructions: 
An act of sodomy or sexual intercourse is 
without. the consent of the vie t im when the actor 
compels the victim to submit or participate by 
force that overcomes such earnest resistance 
that her age, strength of body and mind make it 
reasonable for her to do under the circumstances; 
or by any threat that would prevent resistance 
by a person of ordinary resolution. Such force 
or threats need not be limited to physical vio-
lence but may also include psychological and 
emotional stress or a combination of all three. 
Furthermore, it is not necessary to show that 
the victim engaged in heroics or subjected her-
self to great brutality or suffered or risked 
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serious wounds or injuries. 
The law recognizes a number of factors which 
should be considered to determine if a sexual 
act was performed with or without the consent 
of one of the parties. One factor is evidence 
of marks or bruising on either party reflecting 
actual physical violence. Another factor is the 
opportunity to escape or whether the victim made 
an outcry. These can be reflected in the time of 
day of the incident, the isolated location of the 
incident, the possible sources of assistance in 
the sexual activity to the victim and any active 
participation by the victim. Likewise, the ease 
of assertion of the forcible accomplishment of 
the sexual act with the attendant difficulties 
of defending against such an assertion, and the 
proneness of the victim to assert force or violence 
when she realizes that her activities are likely 
to be discovered may also be considered. These 
factors and any which you may find in the evidence 
or lack thereof, can be considered by you in 
determining whether or not the victim consented 
to the sexual acts alleged to have occurred. 
Appellant also requested that the following instruction be 
given: 
The essential element in rape is the forcing 
of intercourse upon a woman "without her consent" 
and "against her will." These terms do not mean 
the same thing because such an act might occur 
in circumstances which would be "without her 
consent" but which would not necessarily involve 
overcoming her will and her resistance, both of 
which must be proved. If one of these elements 
has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
then you must find the defendant not guilty of 
rape. 
The court refused to give these instructions, and instead 
gave the following instructions: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
You are instructed that sexual intercourse 
occurs "without consent" under any one of the 
following situations: 
1. When the actor compels the victim to 
submit or participate by force that overcomes 
such earnest resistance as might reasonably 
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be expected under the circumsta_!'_C_('._S, nr 
2. The actor compels the victim to suhmit 
or participate by anv threat that would 
prevent resistance bv a person of ordinarv 
resolution. [Emphasis added.] 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
In determining whether the victim's will and 
resistance were overcome, it is appropriate to 
consider that this may be accomplished by either 
physical force and violence or by psychological 
or emtional stress imposed upon her, or by a 
combination of them. As to the degree of 
resistance required: The victim need do no more 
than her age and her strength of body and mind 
make it reasonable for her to do under the 
circumstances to resist. It is not necessary 
that it be shown that she engaged in any 
heriocs or that she otherwise risked the 
assailant's brutality or infliction of serious 
wounds or injuries. [Emphasis added.] 
Defense counsel made a timely objection to the Court's 
refusal to give instructions as requested. 
It is well settled that a party is entitled to have his 
theory of the case submitted to the jury, and it is prejudicial 
error for the trial court to fail to instruct thereon where there 
is evidence to support such theory. Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 
455 (Utah 1981); State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1977); 
Elington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980). 
The purpose of instructions to the jury is to inform them 
as to the applicable law and enable them to resolve the issues. 
Elkington v. Faust, supra at 40. 
Where a trial is by jury, the court may not comment on 
the quality or credibility of the evidence. This means the 
court may not indicate it favors the position of either the 
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.1.;,1- l l::rnt or the state. State v. Sanders, 496 P.2d 270,275 (Utah 
1. - '1, :;rate v. Schoenfeld, 545 P. 2d 193, 197 (Utah 1976). 
l'l1e instruction as to consent proposed by appellant outlines 
che applicable law. The first sentence echoes Utah Code Ann. 
; 76-5-406 (1953 as amended) which states in pertinent part: 
7 6- 5-406. Sexual intercourse, sodomy, or 
sexual abuse without consent of victim--
Circumstances. --An act of sexual intercourse, 
sodomy, or sexual abuse is without consent of 
the victim under any of the following circum-
stances: 
(1) When the actor compels the victim 
to submit or participate by force that over-
comes such earnest resistance as might 
reasonably be expected under the circumstances; 
or 
(2) The actor compels the victim to submit 
or participate by any threat that would prevent 
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution; 
or . 
The second and third sentences of the proposed instruction state 
that force or threats need not be limited to physical violence but 
ma? also include psychological stress, and that the victim need 
not show that she engaged in heroics. This language is found 
in State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 200 (Utah 1977). Thus, the first 
?aragraph makes it clear that physical violence is not necessary 
co show a woman did not consent. 
The second paragraph of the proposed instruction balances 
against the concerns of the first paragraph, and sets forth 
1 1ctors which may be considered to show whether the act was with 
consent. The second sentence would have informed the jury that 
brqising or other physical evidence may be taken into account. 
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See State v. Horne, 365 P.2d lO'J (1Jt3h l'J(d). Escape, outcrv. 
source of assistance may also be considered in determining 
whether a woman consented. State v. Herzog, 610 P.2d 1231 
(Utah 1980). 
The Court chose to instruct the jury that the woman's 
will could be overcome by psychological stress rather than 
just physical force, that a victim must only act reasonably 
and need not engage in heroics. While these statements are 
found in case law, it is important that the jury be instructed 
as to factors it can take into account in determining whether a 
woman consented. As the instruction stands, it serves as an 
improper comment on the evidence. It essentially tells the 
jury the woman, referred to throughout as "victim" (which creates 
initial prejudice) need not be forced physcially or act in any 
specific manner or engage in heroics. Had the Court instructed 
the jury as requested, the jury would have been informed as to 
factors it could consider and not directed in their decision 
making process by weighted instructions suggesting that the 
complainant had acted properly. 
The Court also refused to make it clear to the jury that 
forcing intercourse upon a woman "without her consent" or "agains: 
her will" are two distinct concepts. This distinction is set 
forth in State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700 (Utah 1977). 
Instructions to the jury as to the factors it could considec 
in determining whether the complainant consented and clarifying 
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, ' 1r ".1c;ainst the wi 11" is a different concept than consent 
,,,,1.j rirobabl? ha'Je had a substantial impact on the jury's 
deci.,ion. 
As previously outlined, the complainant's story was inherently 
improbable and inconclusive. Had the jury not been given an 
instruction weighted in favor of the complainant, it is likely 
that the verdict would have been different. Therefore, it 
was reversible error for the court to instruct the jury in the 
manner set forth above. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS TO THE LAW 
APPLICABLE TO INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS HADE 
BY A WITNESS. 
Defense counsel requested that the following instruction be 
given to the jury: 
You are instructed that if a witness has 
made statements prior to the trial which are 
inconsistent with the testimony at trial, and 
that at the time of his prior statements he 
had adequate opportunity to perceive the event 
or condition his prior statements narrates, 
explains, or describes, you may consider such 
prior statements to be substantive evidence 
in this case of the truth of those prior state-
ments and that the declarant of such statements 
has spoken falsely either at the trial or on 
that prior occasion. 
The Court refused, ctnd defense counsel made a timely objection 
to such refusal. 
\fuile the credibility of witnesses is generally a question 
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for the jury, the Court must instrurt lhc juc as to the applin: 
law. Elkington v. Faust, supr§c ilt c'.+IJ, State v. Miltters, f' 
254 (Colo. 1982). In addition, a p.fftv is entitled to have hi. 
theory presented to the jury. \Jatters v. Querrv, supra, State __ -
Maestas, supra. 
Evidence Code Rule 63 (Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended), 
applicable at the time of trial in this matter states in pertinen: 
part: 
Hearsay Evidence Excluded - Exceptions 
Evidence of a statement which is made other than 
by a witness while testifying at the hearing 
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated 
is hearsay evidence and inadmissible except: 
(1) Prior statements of witnesses. A prior 
statement of a witness, if the judge finds that 
the witness had an adequate opportunity to per-
ceive the event or condition which his statement 
narrates, describes or explains, provided that 
(a) it is inconsistent with his present testimony, 
or (b) it contains otherwise admissible facts 
which the witness denies having stated or has 
forgotten since making the statement, or (c) 
it will support testimony made by the witness 
in the present case when such testimony has 
been challenged. 
Thus, prior inconsistent statements by a witness are admissib:, 
for purposes of impeachment and as substantive evidence of the 
truth of the matters stated. The instruction offered by defense 
counsel restates this rule of law. 
The evidence shows that complainant, the principal and 
virtually sole witness against appellant, made several statcment 0 
at reial which were not consistent with statements hild made 
earlier. At the outset of her testimony, complainant stated til.i: 
she had readily admitted appellant into her apartment 1vhen he 
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returned to use the phone (T.11). However, immediately after 
'l1r· incident she told police officers that she had not wanted 
'"let him in (T. 145-146). 
Complainant testified in depth as to the knife being drawn 
at the door and the way in which appellant held the knife to her 
throat while still at the door, whereas she had previously 
told the police that the knife was not drawn until after she 
and appellant were in the bedroom and she was on the bed (T. 
14,50-54,145-146). 
At trial, complainant testified that appellant threw her 
against the bed, floor, walls and headboard (T.18). She had 
not mentioned being thrown against the walls to police immediately 
after the incident (T. 146) or to the rape crisis volunteer who 
spoke with her immediately after the incident (T. 175). 
Complainant implied by her testimony at trial that she was 
not pregnant on the night of the incident, but on the night in 
question she told both the officers and appellant that she was 
pregnant (T. 70,84,146-147,208). 
Clearly, complainant made numerous statements at trial which 
were inconsistent with statements she had made to officers and 
others. Her credibility was of major importance since the 
evidence essentially consisted of her testimony against that of 
appellant. 
In such a situation, it was imperative that the jury be 
instructed as to how to deal with such inconsistent statements 
end that such statements could be considered as substantive 
evidence in addition to raising questions about the credibility 
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of the complainant. Had the jury been in,;tri1c1 ,,d in this manner 
it is probable that thev would have the evidence 
differently and found that the evidence did not show bevond a 
reasonable doubt that appellant was guiltv of aggravated sexual 
assault. 
The fact that complainant was pregnant, or believed herself 
to be pregnant on the night of the incident, was critical to 
appellant's theory that complainant agreed to have sexual 
intercourse with him and subsequently accused him of aggravated 
sexual assault to shield herself. Thus, it was critical to 
appellant's case that the jury understand that complainant's 
statements to officers and appellant that she was pregnant 
could be considered substantively for the truth of the matter 
stated. 
Complainant's lengthy description of the knife scene at 
the front door was damaging to appellant; it was critical that 
the jury not only understand that she had previously made 
statements which were substantially different, but also that 
this statement and other inconsistencies should be looked at 
to determine the overall credibility of the witness. 
Similarly, the story at trial as to how appellant threw 
her against walls and floors should have been evaluated in 
light of her overall credibility. Her changing story as to 
whether she voluntarily admitted appellant into her apartment 
raised additional questions as to her credibility, and the 
jury needed zuidance as to how to evaluate her testimony. 
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In all cases where a witness makes inconsistent statements, 
1,,, ,11r·r should he instructed as to how it can evaluate such 
,1c<>r1·, istencies, Howc'1er, in a rape case where the complainant 
is essentiallv the sole witness against a defendant and some of 
Lhc inconsistences, if looked at for substantive purposes, 
support the appellant's theory, it is essential that the jury 
be instructed as requested by defense counsel in order to 
adequately evaluate the evidence. 
The trial court's failure to instruct the jury as to how 
to view inconsistent statements by a witness amounted to 
reversible error and the verdict should therefore be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
Evidence that complainant had sexual intercourse within 
forty eight hours of the incident should have been admitted. 
Such evidence was relevant to the issues of consent and credi-
i,i li ty of the complainant, and did not present any other over-
riding concerns which would have precluded such admission. Had 
such evidence been admitted, it is likely that the jury would 
h3ve reached a different verdict. In addition, failure to admit 
such evidence violated appellant's constitutional rights to 
confront witnesses against him. 
The right to due process of law is guaranteed by the 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
1·t'cle I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. The appellant's 
;noccss right was violated when the State failed to preserve 
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the pocketknife which appellant alledcedly used to threaten 
complainant. 
---
There was insufficient evidence to sustain the convictirllJ 
In a rape case, the evidence must be carefully scrutinized to 
avoid unmerited conviction. The State's case does not survive 
such scrutiny. Complainant's story was inherently improbable 
and inconclusive. In addition, the jury was not properly 
instructed on the law of consent. 
Finally, the trial court failed to properly instruct the 
jury as to the law regarding inconsistent statements by a 
witness. In this case, complainant's credibility was an 
essential issue since she was the principal witness. In addition, 
the jury should have been made aware that her prior statements 
could be considered substantively. Failure to do so, where, 
as here, prior statements supported appellant's case, is 
reversible error. 
While each of these errors, standing alone, was significant 
enough to require reversal, the cumulative effect of such 
errors magnifies the unfairness at trial and is sufficient 
to mandate reversal of the conviction or a remand for a new 
trial. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, and all of the reasons 
to be presented at oral argument, if any, appellant respectfull:: 
requests that the conviction in this case be reversed or, in 
the alternative, the matter be remanded for new trial. 
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Respectfully submitted this day of April, 1984. 
' j ( .j 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
co the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this ...2L___ day of April, 1984. 
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